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Abstract: This inquiry seeks to establish that Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon espoused fundamentally different visions of socialism. Marx 
regarded Proudhon with initial enthusiasm and joined the left at large in 
celebrating his 1840 essay, What is Property? However, in 1846, when 
Proudhon attempted to solve the problems of capitalism in his work, 
System of Economic of Contradictions or The Philosophy of Poverty, Marx 
took to his pen for an unsparing attack, authoring his The Poverty of 
Philosophy. At the crux of their split were two analyses of the status of labor 
and two competing prescriptions for change. While Proudhon wished to 
align property rights and access to means of production in favor of laborers 
in a decentralized fashion, Marx saw the need for a radical political change 
along with the abolition of property and the market system. The differences 
in the two visions have echoed in the debates over socialism ever since.  
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This inquiry seeks to establish that Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
espoused fundamentally different visions of socialism. The two men worked 
tirelessly in their respective quests to pave a way out of the capitalist 
system, a system that they both understood to be a source of mass poverty 
production. Yet their worldviews, along with their chosen approaches to 
creating change, diverged dramatically. Proudhon sought peace, harmony, 
and equilibrium, and believed in justice and reason as all-powerful 
principles. He wanted individual freedom and attempted to develop forms 
of commodity production that did away with exploitation and gave workers 
power over the operations. Marx, on the other hand, saw conflict as 
inevitable given the class antagonisms inherent in capitalism, and believed 
there was no possibility for the reconciliation of proletarian interests within 
the existing system. For him, nothing less than political revolution would 
suffice.   
 
Foundations of analysis 
To understand the two diverging viewpoints, and why their 
differences would become irreconcilable, it is helpful to understand that the 
two men were born to very different circumstances. Proudhon was born in 
1809 in a Burgundy suburb. With his father a cooper, his mother a cook, 
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the family was to remain poor. Proudhon’s education came from a nearby 
parish, and to contribute financially, he also did farm work at a young age 
and entered a printing apprenticeship.  D.W. Brogan (1934, 10), in his 
biography, notes that Proudhon felt pride in his “free peasant” roots. 
Proudhon, while rejecting organized religion, named the Bible as one of his 
main influences. His trade work also exerted an influence on his vision for 
the world, grounding it in a belief in the wealth producing potential of 
labor. He spent his life, always in France, pursuing various enterprises 
alongside his writing. He made various investments; he operated a printing 
press; he worked in his father’s trade as a cooper at times; he started a bank 
called “The People’s Bank” along the lines of his philosophy, believing free 
credit to be a powerful tool to the economic liberation of the proletarian 
classes. Through run-ins with censorship and imprisonment, he continued 
to put out his critiques of society while finding one way or another to make 
a living for his family. 
Marx, on the other hand, was born to the professional class. His 
father was a lawyer who had painted over his Jewish roots in order better to 
be accepted in German society. Born in 1818, he experienced the best 
education Germany had to offer, learning at University of Berlin just after 
the passing of the revered Georg Friedrich Hegel. His life work would be the 
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development of his economic analysis along with the communist doctrine 
that he saw as the inevitable conclusion of this analysis, which he extended 
to work in building the International Communist League. After the death of 
his father in 1841, poverty chronically plagued him. He moved around, 
from Germany, to France, to Brussels, and finally to England, as the 
political circumstances changed, barely eking out enough for his family to 
survive, and depending on his friend and collaborator, Friedrich Engels, for 
supplementary support.   
 Marx’s thinking developed as he assimilated the contributions of 
various thinkers, as Isaiah Berlin [1960] (2013) describes in his biography. 
From Hegel, Berlin (2013, 56) remarks, Marx absorbed dialectical thinking, 
the perception of history unfolding in a series of antagonisms, the thesis, 
the antithesis, and the synthesis, which would resolve the antagonism but 
from which would emerge new contradictions. Upon reading the materialist 
writings of Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach, Berlin (2013, 70-1) notes, Marx 
kept the dialectical model but discarded the idealism to which Hegel and 
his followers attached it. Instead, he accepted Feuerbach’s proposal that 
material conditions, rather than, as Hegel had it, spiritual underpinnings, 
propelled the unfolding events of history.  
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To this foundational structure, Marx elaborated with the view that 
struggle between economic classes was, in particular, the factor that drove 
the course of history, an idea, Berlin (2013, 83) points out, developed by 
Henri de Saint-Simon, who was one of a new type of liberal historians 
writing at the turn of the 19th Century. Though an exhaustive list of Marx’s 
intellectual influences is perhaps impossible, two other sources seem to be 
central to the worldview he developed. First, as Berlin (2013, 174) points 
out, it was the French Revolution writer François-Noël Babeuf, who 
developed the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This is the idea that 
would set Marx distinctly, irreconcilably apart from the anarchists who had 
sought to collaborate in the Communist league. This endorsement of 
dictatorship, one suspects, also contributed to making Marx’s work 
required literature in the most notorious, brutal dictatorships that would 
develop in the 20th Century under the name of Communism, however far 
they veered from Marx’s vision of a communist society.  
Second—and more benignly, though just as importantly to the 
intellectual content of Marx’s work—Berlin  (2013, 14) notes that Marx 
studied the classical economists, with Adam Smith and, above all, David 
Ricardo, providing the inspiration and the preliminary workings-out of 
Marx’s labor theory of value, upon which his analysis of the capitalist 
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system and its exploitation in large part rested. His labor theory of value, so 
assiduously worked out, would be an important source of clash with 
Proudhon.  
Berlin (2013, 75) notes that it was in Paris, where he arrived in 1843 
and lived until 1845, that Marx came fully into the development of his 
particular vision. It was here he met Proudhon, with whom he had 
corresponded previously. The intellectual vibrancy and revolutionary fervor 
were a great inspiration to Marx, though he took a critical stance even 
towards those who would seem to be natural allies. 
The two men had very different intellectual approaches. One can see 
in Proudhon’s work passion and dreaminess, along with a reverence for the 
ideals of justice and reason, features in common with the French literature 
and culture that held a strong influence over him; in Marx, one witnesses 
both the plunging intellectualism found in the German works that inspired 
him, paired with the assiduous cataloguing of details in line with the 
English writings he absorbed before arriving in the country where he was 
eventually to live the last part of his life. Whereas Marx conscientiously 
studied Ricardo and Smith, as well as a long list of political economists, 
philosophers, and what he called the “vulgar” economists, the thinkers who 
built the foundations of the neoclassical economics that is practiced widely 
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today, Proudhon was fine with getting Hegel secondhand, with drawing 
from a variety of thinkers while diverging from their exact ideas in pursuit 
of his own, creative vision. He was certainly not illiterate; he read widely, 
with particular attention to socialist thinkers such as Charles Fourier, but 
he was not the painstaking scholar that Marx was.  
Proudhon’s casual treatment of others’ ideas allowed him to develop 
his own concepts in a creative way. As Henri de Lubac (1948, 152), in his 
work on Proudhon’s life and thought, The un-Marxian Socialist, points out, 
Proudhon, inspired by Hegel’s dialectic as well as Kant’s concept of 
antinomy, developed a different, though similar model of development: 
equilibrium, in which contradictions persist unresolved but find a gradual 
balance. As opposed to Hegel’s progression of theses, antitheses, and 
syntheses, de Lubac (1948, 155) notes that Proudhon believed that the same 
antagonistic elements would never be negated but rather produce an 
oscillation; the two opposing elements would not eliminate but moderate as 
well as “exalt” each other. De Lubac (1948, 157) notes that Proudhon 
proposed a reciprocity of pairs of elements: property and the State, order 
and freedom, socialism and political economy.  The concept of harmony, 
which Proudhon, as de Lubac (1948, 157-8) notes, received from Fourier, 
figured centrally into his vision. History would proceed towards harmony. 
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Proudhon, in stark contrast to Marx, identified certain ideals as 
foundational to human understanding as well as historical progress. Justice 
and equality, for him, were determinative principles. In Proudhon’s eyes, as 
de Lubac (1948, 278) notes, justice quite literally “governs the world” as 
well as human understanding, leading towards harmonious equilibrium. 
Marx’s severe faithfulness to his vision had the advantage of 
producing one of the most in-depth analyses of society ever produced; it 
had the disadvantage of producing a belief system as domineering as 
religious doctrine (ironically, for a man who so loathed religion.) 
Proudhon’s intellectual promiscuity had the advantage of permitting a 
variety of ideas to live alongside one another, to allow for an openness of 
thought; the disadvantage was perhaps that too many ideas could survive in 
this intellectual atmosphere. Proudhon wrote against war, and then 
accepted it as a necessity. He harbored a number of prejudices: he viewed 
women as incapable of the self-directed lives he wished for men; he hated 
the railroads and their assault on older industries. He engaged in faulty 






The Definitive Split:  
The Philosophy of Poverty and Marx’s response 
Marx initially praised Proudhon’s work. At the time Marx arrived in Paris, 
Proudhon had gained international renown and a national following. His 
socialist writings, Berlin (2013, 89) notes, were well known in France and 
beyond.  In particular, Berlin (2013, 104) notes, Marx had read and praised 
Proudhon’s 1840 work, What is Property?, out of which comes Proudhon’s 
most famous phrase, “What is Property? It’s theft.” Proudhon’s indictment 
of property owners who received income while contributing nothing was in 
line enough with the broad goals of the left for Marx to be an admirer. The 
seeds of their divergence, however, were already planted. It was in What is 
Property? that Proudhon identified himself as an “anarchist,” finding the 
authority of government to be as wrong as the authority of capital. (His 
“anarchism,” it should be noted, was a very moderate variety and distinct 
from other anarchists, such as the contemporary Mikhail Bakunin, who 
experienced his own falling out with Marx.) 
It was not until 1846, however, that the two split definitively. 
Proudhon published his work, System of Economic Contradictions, or The 
Philosophy of Poverty, and submitted it to Marx for feedback. In this work, 
Proudhon seeks to reconcile the antagonism between socialism and 
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political economy, between the material gifts of the productive system due 
to technology and the division of labor, on the one hand, and the 
exploitative dynamics of capital-labor relations, on the other. He gives his 
critique of the views offered by the orthodox economists such as J.B. Say 
and the proposals of socialists, offering his own, somewhat spotty economic 
analyses, covering the issues of tax, wages, competition, and technology.  
Marx did not take kindly to Proudhon’s attempt to reconcile forces 
that he saw as fundamentally inimical. In reply to Proudhon’s work, he 
published The Poverty of Philosophy, A response to “The Philosophy of 
Poverty” by M. Proudhon [1867], turning Proudhon’s title on its head. He 
tore Proudhon’s analyses and proposed solutions to shreds. Marx attacked 
Proudhon on two levels. First, he found Proudhon to be intellectually 
deficient: he calls him a “sophist,” accusing him of allowing bold rhetoric to 
cover up a basic lack of understanding of economic thought. Marx, with his 
mastery of history and economic thought, cites at length Proudhon’s 
intellectual predecessors, whose ideas, in Marx’s view, Proudhon has failed 
to comprehend, erased by claiming for himself intellectual “discoveries,” or 
which have preemptively invalidated Proudhon’s arguments. Beyond this, 
however, Marx is levelling a more serious accusation. It is the one which he 
repeats in The Communist Manifesto and throughout his works: that 
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Proudhon’s is a petit bourgeois socialism, a veiled apology for the capitalist 
system rather than a true challenge to it.  
The first accusation may have some merit. De Lubac (1948, 23-4) 
notes that even Proudhon himself admits to his own intellectual 
flightiness—and, to be fair, any thinker facing a comparison to the rigor of a 
behemoth like Marx is inclined to seem unserious. The accusation of 
Proudhon’s intellectual deficiency is complicated, however, by the 
possibility that Marx was simply disturbed by the fact that the successful 
Proudhon, elder to Marx by nine years, was writing about the same topics 
Marx planned to address—and coming to different conclusions. Brogan 
(1938, 45-46) notes that Proudhon saw Marx’s response purely as a 
manifestation of jealousy that he was first past the post on these topics, and 
more successful. Brogan also notes, however, that there were fundamental 
differences between the two both in aim and in method.  
The aim of this inquiry is not to pronounce judgment on whether 
Marx’s attack of the quality of Proudhon’s work is justified. Rather, our 
focus is on Marx’s criticism of Proudhon’s essential positions. The task is 
difficult, for these two levels of criticism cannot be entirely disentangled: it 
was Proudhon’s errors, in Marx’s rendering, that led to the bourgeois 
conclusions of his analysis. (Marx finds these bourgeois-friendly errors in 
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many writings, in the classical economists, for instance.) We will examine 
two concepts essential to the differences in Marx’s and Proudhon’s 
economic thinking, the labor theory of value and the analysis of commodity 
exchange. These two concepts are essential to the differences in Marx’s and 
Proudhon’s economic thinking and, as we shall come to in the third part of 
this inquiry, to the conclusions they came to about the correct methods of 
producing change.  
As Berlin (2013, 109) summarizes, Marx’s view was that Proudhon 
had misunderstood Ricardo with regard to the labor theory of value. Where 
Ricardo saw the theory that labor underlies exchange value as a 
straightforward statement of the way things actually worked, Proudhon 
believed, instead, that it was a solution: if labor truly became the basis of 
exchange value, workers would be justly compensated. It was an error, in 
Marx’s eyes, at the basis of many forms of socialism, and an error 
responsible, in turn, for Proudhon’s misunderstanding of money, 
commodity exchange, and the entire economic structure of capitalism. 
Proudhon’s analysis of the status of labor within the economic system 
is the central point of Marx’s critique on this subject. Proudhon (1972, 101), 
accepting the view of Say and orthodox economists, states that labor is not 
merchandise. When it is said to have value, there is a contraction of 
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expression at work. (Here we see Proudhon’s philological flair.) The true 
meaning of the expression is that labor’s product has a certain amount of 
value.   
Such an analysis is entirely at odds with that of Marx. As he would 
develop extensively in Capital and other works, the commodification of 
labor was a defining fact of the capitalist system. Labor was absolutely, and 
quite literally, merchandise. Engels (1920, 27), in prefacing the The Poverty 
of Philosophy, notes that Marx had not yet developed the terminological 
distinction between labor and labor-power. However, Marx’s critique 
already embodies this distinction. The value of labor—or rather, as it would 
be identified later, the value of the labor-power commodity, was 
determined by the amount of labor necessary to produce it, that is, to 
produce the means of subsistence of the laborer. The formula for the value 
of other commodities was analogous: the amount of labor necessary to 
produce them determined their value. In Marx’s The Poverty of Philosophy 
[1867] (1920), Marx (1920, 59) accused Proudhon of conflating the value of 
labor (i.e., the value of labor-power) and the labor-determined relative 
value of commodities. Furthermore, not to recognize labor as a commodity 
was the ultimate in bourgeois thought—to pretend labor commodification 
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was only an expression and not a brutal fact which forced laborers to sell 
their only possession was to ignore the essence of capitalism.  
 In part, the dispute may come down to a deliberate semantic 
difference in the two thinkers. When Proudhon “conflates” the value of 
labor and the relative value of commodities, he is establishing his version of 
just compensation: the value of labor was measured by its product, while 
the value of products (commodities) was reciprocally measured by the labor 
that produced them. For Proudhon, this theory of value led to a system of 
just proportionality of compensation: the products of labor would be valued 
in relation to one another according to the amount of labor that went into 
them, and laborers would be compensated accordingly—so long as they 
were not working under capitalists. The problem with the capitalist system, 
for Proudhon, was the violation of this proportionality. Those who did not 
work received compensation due to an unjust arrangement of rights and 
resources.  
For Marx, proportionality existed: but in the productive system of 
advanced capitalism, the value of the labor commodity figured as 
infinitesimal in relation to other commodities, because such a small 
amount of labor was necessary to produce it, i.e., to produce the means of 
subsistence of the laborer. Marx saw Proudhon’s value theory as circular: 
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how could labor value be determined by its product and products be 
determined by labor? The circularity is not fatal to Proudhon’s analysis if 
one accepts that labor acts simply to provide proportionality of value to 
commodities. However, Marx’s definition of labor as a commodity made 
their two viewpoints irreconcilable.  
Proudhon’s treatment of commodity production and exchange also 
meets Marx’s total rejection. For Marx, Proudhon begins in error: His 
analysis starts with two individuals, two “free” individuals. Proudhon erases 
their embeddedness within systems to imagine them free.  In Capital, Marx 
(2011, 79) leaves a footnote concerning Proudhon, proposing that his 
misunderstanding of relative value comes down to the fact that that 
commodity production is the ultimate dream of the petit bourgeois, the 
path to freedom and independence. To Marx, commodity production was 
coextensive with capitalist production. Marx (1920, 84) denounces 
individual exchange as inherently bourgeois, inherently composing and 
composed of class antagonism.  
Whereas Proudhon saw commodity exchange as serving to satisfy the 
variety of human wants, Marx saw it as determining wants, determining 
consumption by the law of what is cheapest to make and what, in 
consequence, allows for the most surplus labor to be extracted. He (1920, 
15 
 
67) poses the question of why cotton, potatoes, and spirits are produced far 
more than their superior alternatives, linen, wheat, and beer. His answer is 
that “in a society founded on poverty the poorest products have the fatal 
prerogative of being used by the greatest number.” Circumstances of 
production, for Marx, are always determinative of patterns of consumption.  
Marx asserts that Proudhon’s assessment of prices is false, but beyond that, 
Marx finds in Proudhon’s analysis a wishful way of seeing society, a 
“bourgeois”-colored view, that the structure of society, in particular, its 
practices of production, faithfully addresses the needs and desires of the 
people. The result, Marx (1920, 68) claims, was that Proudhon, without 
understanding society, wrote an apology for it.  
 
Methods for Creating Change 
From the two distinct analyses of the economic system came two very 
different conclusions as to how to go about bringing positive change. 
Proudhon, despite being a committed fighter for the left, came to symbolize 
a certain form of impotent socialism in Marx’s eyes. In Marx’s 1848 
Manifesto of the Communist Party (now known simply as the Communist 
Manifesto), which was commissioned by the Communist League, as Berlin 
(2013, 153) notes,  to offer a definitive summary of the doctrines to which 
Marx and his co-author, Friedrich Engel, ascribed, Marx identifies the 
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various deficient forms of socialism and communism, analyzing their faults.  
There was “reactionary socialism,” practiced by classes that had survived 
from the old, feudal order who looked still to the past for their salvation. 
There was “conservative or bourgeois socialism,” which sought, rather than 
true change, to cure the proletariat of their resentments while maintaining 
the existing order. And there was “critical-utopian socialism and 
communism,” offered by philosophers who had not yet seen capitalism in 
its full-fledged form, which built fantasies rather than real world solutions. 
Marx (2012, 98) identified The Philosophy of Poverty as epitomizing 
the second type: conservative or bourgeois socialism. Again and again 
throughout Marx’s works, Proudhon served as the archetype of the “petit 
bourgeois” way of thinking, which accepted the basic foundations of the 
capitalist system. In the view of Marx, as Berlin (2013, 93) notes, 
Proudhon’s thinking was anything but revolutionary.  
For Marx, as he (1920, 66) writes in The Poverty of Philosophy, it was 
simple: “No antagonism, no progress.” Proudhon, on the other hand, 
sought harmony. As de Lubac (1948, 32) notes, he even referred to himself 
periodically, slightly in jest, as a Conservative. Marx wanted political 
revolution, the abolition of property and class divisions, along with a 
proletarian government that would distribute all social products according 
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to need; Proudhon wanted to develop methods of economic empowerment 
for workers, centered around the restructuring of property rights in favor of 
labor, the availability of free credit, and the development of workers’ 
associations which would put the means of production into the hands of the 
workers in a decentralized fashion.  
Proudhon by no means stayed out of the fray of political life. Not only 
did he stand for election and get elected (briefly) in the socialist party, he 
went to prison for his revolutionary writings. Yet, despite his high 
engagement in political life, Proudhon, as George Comninel (2015, 76) in 
his essay, “Marx and the Politics of the First International,” puts well, took 
a rather “anti-political stance.” Brogan (1934, 59) adds the point that for 
Proudhon, government inherently functioned in the interests of those that 
governed.  
Instead of striving for political power, Proudhon sought to establish 
new systems that would put property in the hands of those that put it to 
productive ends—the workers. In spite of his most famous phrase that 
“property is theft,” Proudhon did not wish to abolish property, but rather 
align it with use: those who lived in a home were its rightful owners; those 
who worked on a field were the field’s rightful owners. In pursuit of this 
vision, he called for the availability of interest-free credit (and worked to 
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establish his People’s Bank on this principle) along with the development of 
associations between workers in order to control the means of production 
collaboratively, an idea, inspired by Fourier, that went under the name 
“mutualism”. He believed the market had great advantages in catering to 
the diversity of human needs and wants, but in its current form it was 
corrupted: the working class was entering into the market not quite freely 
but under the fetters of the unjust property system.  
Marx saw the market and all property as inherently engendering an 
oppressive class system. He saw the answer in proletarian political power. 
He agreed that government was for those who governed. At least, he 
believed this when it came to the current system, but he believed all 
interests would be united under the eventually classless communist regime.  
The differences between the two visions came alive during meetings 
of the International Workingmen’s Association, known as the First 
International. It was in this organization, begun in 1864 by working class 
men in England, that Marx, as Comninel (2014, 60) notes, was to gain 
recognition as a force in the socialist front, eventually becoming leader of 
its general council. Proudhon had his own following, the Proudhonists, in 
attendance. They espoused Proudhon’s policies on property and credit, 
along with his skepticism of authority. The Marxian faction, on the other 
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hand, called for a powerful, centralized government brought on through 
revolutionary action. In contrast to Proudhon, who disavowed many 
confrontational tactics, they saw strikes as an absolutely vital tool in their 
struggle. The two factions would split off (with another faction under the 
more radical anarchist Bakunin splitting off as well.) The legacy of their two 
visions has echoed through debates around socialism ever since. 
 
Conclusion 
This inquiry has sought to establish that Proudhon and Marx espoused 
different understandings of socialism. Marx, on the one hand, espoused the 
need for political change and, ultimately, revolution. Proudhon sought, on 
the other hand, to build economic institutions that would allow workers to 
develop independence from capitalist exploiters while benefitting from the 
cooperative system of production. Marx’s ‘centralist’ and Proudhon’s 
‘mutualist’ approaches to socialism have served as the foundation for 
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